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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The law is for the protection of the weak more than the strong.1 
Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.2 
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio focuses a great deal of attention 
on Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation statute.3  On June 27, 2001, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio issued a split decision in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage 
Company,4 which declared Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931 unconstitutional in 
its present form.  Under Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931, statutory subrogees5 
were granted extremely broad rights to recover amounts of compensation and 
benefits paid to a claimant when that claimant was injured as a result of third-party 
negligence.6  The statutory subrogee was given the automatic right to recover from 
any settlement or judgment that the injured employee received from the third-party 
tortfeasor to satisfy the amount of compensation and benefits paid out in a particular 
claim.7  
The majority in Holeton criticized the specific provision in § 4123.931(A) that 
allowed a statutory subrogee to recover an amount equal to the estimated future 
                                                                
1Sir William Erle, English Jurist; Chief Justice, (1850). 
2Edmund Burke, (1780). 
3OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.931 (Anderson 2001). 
4Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001). 
5See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93(B) (Anderson 2001) (“‘statutory subrogee’ means 
the administrator of the Bureau of Workers Compensation, a self-insuring employer, or an 
employer that contracts for the direct payment of medical services pursuant to division (L) of 
section 4121.44 of the Revised Code.”)  
6PHILIP J. FULTON, OHIO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 14.25 (2d ed. 1998). 
7Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, LPA, Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute 
Ruled Unconstitutional, Volume 12, Issue 4, OHIO EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER (August 2001) 
at 4 [hereinafter Denlinger] (stating that the statutory subrogees “were entitled to receive an 
amount equal to past payments of compensation and medical benefits as well as estimated 
future compensation and medical costs.”)  Id. 
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workers’ compensation costs.8  Thus, the court held that this provision in section 
4123.931 amounted to an unconstitutional taking of the employee’s property and a 
violation of due process.9  Additionally, the majority criticized section 4123.931’s 
differing treatment of settlements and judgments after trial.10  The court decided that 
this differing treatment amounted to an unconstitutional taking, a violation of due 
process, and a denial of equal protection rights by distinguishing between injured 
workers who actually try their tort claims and those who settle their tort claims out of 
court.11  As a result of the Holeton decision, subrogation rights in Ohio are 
surrounded by confusion, uncertainty, and disagreement. 
This Note begins by examining the complex history behind workers’ 
compensation subrogation rights in the state of Ohio.  This historical timeline flows 
from the period when statutory subrogation was non-existent in Ohio, to the first 
version of a subrogation statute in 1993, and finally to the broadened and revised 
statute in 1995.  A detailed examination of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in 
Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company follows the historical overview and focuses on 
the unconstitutionality of Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931.  Additionally, the 
popular competing views gleaned from both the dissent in Holeton and the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation’s Motion for Reconsideration are discussed to demonstrate 
the wide scope of disagreement this decision has created in Ohio.  In portraying both 
sides of the various subrogation arguments, this note asserts that the decision reached 
in Holeton was correct. 
Having set the stage, the discussion turns to the various controversies the Holeton 
decision has generated in Ohio and those it will generate in the future.  This 
discussion focuses on whether the temporary revival of the 1993 subrogation 
statute12 is an appropriate course of action.  Additionally, the possible refund of all 
subrogation payments received by the Bureau as a result of the improper and 
unconstitutional application of the 1995 statute is also discussed.  Finally, this Note 
provides insight as to what the General Assembly should consider while drafting a 
new subrogation statute. This Note asserts that the 1993 statute should not be 
considered revived, and that the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation should be 
enjoined from asserting any subrogation rights under the 1995 statute.  Therefore, the 
refund of all subrogation payments unconstitutionally received by the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation through section 4123.931 is warranted.   
This Note concludes that once the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation has repaid 
that which it has improperly and unconstitutionally taken from injured employees in 
the state of Ohio, the General Assembly should pass a new statute that achieves the 
statutory purpose of subrogation, is fair to the injured employee, and reflects on the 
employee’s constitutional rights. 
                                                                
8Id. 
9Id.  See also Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1125 (holding that Ohio Revised Code § 4123.931 
violated Article I, sections 16 and 19 of the Ohio Constitution).  
10Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
11Id.  See also Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1127 (holding that Ohio Revised Code § 4123.931 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution).  
12OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (repealed 1995) (reenacted as a definitional statute in 
House Bill 278).  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
76 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:73 
II.  THE HISTORY OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SUBROGATION IN OHIO 
The state of Ohio has never had the benefit of a strong workers’ compensation 
subrogation statute that conferred legitimate subrogation rights.  Before 1993, there 
were no workers’ compensation subrogation rights under Ohio statutory law.13  In 
1993, the General Assembly made its first attempt at a subrogation statute, which 
resulted in extremely limited enforcement success.14  In response, the General 
Assembly adopted a revised 1995 subrogation statute.15  This statute has been 
operating unconstitutionally since its inception.16  Presently, the state of Ohio is 
refusing to refund the millions of dollars wrongfully taken from the injured workers 
of Ohio under the 1995 unconstitutional statute.  
A.  The Early History of Subrogation in Ohio 
A basic right of subrogation involves “the substitution of one person in place of 
another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right.”17  A right of subrogation 
in the workers’ compensation context was created to prevent an employee from 
receiving a double recovery: recovery from the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
and from the third-party tortfeasor.18  Initially, however, there was no statutory 
provision regarding subrogation in Ohio law that allowed the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation [hereinafter the Bureau] or a self-insured employer to recover the 
compensation and benefits paid to an employee when that employee was injured by a 
third-party.19  This is apparent in Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbell Cliffs Furnace Co.,20 
which held that an employer could not recover any sum to reimburse any amount 
paid in workers’ compensation benefits, regardless of whether their employee’s 
injury resulted from the negligence of a third party.21  
Due to the absence of an Ohio statute that would effectively subrogate the 
employer to the employee’s claim against the third party regarding workers’ 
compensation benefits received by the employee, early court decisions formulated 
exceptions to the harsh rule enumerated in Truscon.22  For example, in 1949, in 
                                                                
13See infra text accompanying note 19. 
14See infra text accompanying notes 34, 35. 
15See infra text accompanying notes 40, 41. 
16See infra text accompanying note 60. 
17FULTON, supra note 6. 
18Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4 (“The most common subrogation claims involve motor 
vehicle accidents, but they may also involve product liability claims, animal bites, medical 
malpractice, or any other situation in which an employee receives workers’ compensation 
benefits because of injuries caused by a third party.”).  
19W. Craig Bashein & Paul W. Flowers, Assessing the Impact of Holeton, at 3 (Aug. 9, 
2001) (unpublished) (citing Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbell Cliffs Furnace Co., 166 N.E. 368 
(Ohio 1929)). 
20166 N.E. 368 (Ohio 1929). 
21Id. at 398-99. 
22See Bashein, supra note 19, at 4  (citing Ledex, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 461 N.E.2d 1299 
(Ohio 1984)).  
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Midvale Coal Company v. Cardox Corporation,23 the court held that when the third 
party tortfeasor’s negligence breached an agreement with the employer, the employer 
was permitted to recover compensation and benefits paid from the actual wrongdoer 
through a cause of action that was separate and distinct from the employee’s tort 
claim.24  The injured employee was still permitted a double recovery from both the 
Bureau and the third-party tortfeasor, regardless of the employer’s separate 
recovery.25   
This exception to the rule lasted until 1963, when the Midvale decision was 
overruled by Fischer Construction Company v. Stroud,26 which reaffirmed Truscon 
and held that no subrogation rights existed, and there were no tolerated exceptions.27  
Subrogation rights, or the lack thereof, existed in this manner until 1984, when the 
court in Ledex, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp.,28 reinstated the Midvale decision.29  The 
Midvale standard regarding subrogation rights in Ohio remained until 1993, when 
the General Assembly made its first attempt at creating a statutory right of 
subrogation. 
B.  The 1993 Ohio Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute 
Effective October 20, 1993, the Bureau and self-insured employers obtained 
limited subrogation rights, when the Ohio General Assembly adopted House Bill 
107.30  House Bill 107 enacted Ohio Revised Code section 4123.93,31 which 
provided “a right of subrogation in favor of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
and self-insuring employers for amounts of compensation and benefits paid in 
connection with workers’ compensation claims which result from third-party 
negligence.”32  Money collected under this new subrogation statute directly benefited 
self-insured employers, whereas money collected by the Bureau benefited the state 
fund, thereby, lowering the premium rates for the employer.33   
The statute, however, only created a right of subrogation for some types of 
recoveries obtained by injured employees. 34  Due to the statute’s poor drafting and 
                                                                
2389 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1949). 
24Id. at 451. 
25Id.   
26175 Oho St. 31 (Ohio 1963). 
27Id. at 34. 
28461 N.E.2d 1299 (Ohio 1984). 
29See Bashein, supra note 19, at 5 (citing Ledex, Inc.).  According to Bashein and Flowers, 
“[a]s a result [of the Ledex decision], the only recovery available to an employer whose 
employee was injured by a third party was a claim for the increased workers’ compensation 
premiums suffered as a result.” Bashein, supra note 19, at 4.   
30See Bashein, supra note 19, at 4.  
31OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (repealed 1995)  (reenacted as a definitional statute in 
House Bill 278).   
32FULTON, supra note 6. 
33Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
34Bashein, supra note 19, at 6.  
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limited enforcement success, the statute was ineffective in the collection of 
subrogation funds.35  For example, Ohio courts decided that the 1993 subrogation 
statute did not apply to out of court settlements,36 to recoveries received from the 
injured employee’s own motorist insurance policy,37 to wrongful death actions,38 and 
to the employee’s reasonable attorney fees and court costs that exceeded the 
workers’ compensation benefits paid.39   
Due to the 1993 statute’s poor drafting and extremely limited success, the 
Bureau’s law department assisted the Ohio General Assembly in drafting a new 
subrogation statute that would give the Bureau and self-insured employers stronger 
and broader subrogation rights.40   
C.  The 1995 Ohio Workers’ Compensation Subrogation Statute 
Effective September 29, 1995, as part of House Bill 278, the Ohio Legislature 
repealed and reenacted Ohio Revised Code section 4123.93 as a definitional statute, 
and renumbered the revised subrogation statute as section 4123.931.41  The newly 
revised statute created a right of subrogation to benefit a statutory subrogee, defined 
as “the administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, a self-insuring 
employer, or an employer that contracts for the direct payment of medical services 
through approved health care program.”42  The statutory subrogees were given the 
automatic right to recover any settlement or judgment that the injured claimant was 
able to receive from the negligent third party, in virtually any type of situation 
imaginable, regardless of whether litigation was filed in court.43  Additionally, they 
were entitled to receive an amount equal to “past payments of compensation and 
medical benefits and estimated future values of compensation and medical 
benefits.”44   
The other major controversial provision of the 1995 statute was that the entire 
amount of any settlement or compromise received by an injured employee was 
subject to the subrogation rights of a statutory subrogee, regardless of how the 
                                                                
35Id. 
36Id. (citing Gregory v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 686 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio 
1996)).  
37Id. (citing Schultz v. Yellow Freight Syst., No. 96APE03-382, 1996 WL 729867 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 10th Dist. Dec. 17, 1996)). 
38Id. (citing Sallach v. United Airlines, Inc., 698 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio 1997)).  
39Bashein, supra note 19, at 7 (citing State v. Swanger, No. 9-99-14, 1999 WL 692464 
(Ohio Ct. App. 3rd Dist. Aug. 3, 1999)).  
40FULTON, supra note 6. 
41Rhonda Gail Davis, The Aftermath of Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company: The Status 
of Workers Compensation Subrogation, at 2.  (Aug. 9, 2001) (unpublished).   
42FULTON, supra note 6 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (B)). 
43Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.931(A) (Anderson 
2001). 
44OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.931(A) (Anderson 2001). 
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settlement was characterized.45  In addition, any designation of funds to avoid this 
specific section was void, unless special jury interrogatories were used to designate 
the different types of damages.46   
Subrogation under the new section 4123.931 worked fairly well for the Bureau 
and employers alike from 1995 through 2001.  In many instances, however, the 
broad scope of the statute did not work to the benefit of the injured worker.47  This 
broad and lopsided effect of section 4123.931 prompted numerous attacks on the 
statute’s constitutionality under Ohio law48 that paved the way for an injured 
employee, his attorneys, and the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers to challenge 
Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation statute as unconstitutional in Holeton v. 
Crouse Cartage Company. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO’S DECISION IN HOLETON V. CROUSE  
CARTAGE COMPANY 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company 
was a critical first step in correcting the unjust impact that the 1995 subrogation 
statute had on the injured workers of Ohio.  Holeton has effectively paved the way 
for strong arguments in favor of refunding the millions of dollars that were 
impermissibly taken under the unconstitutional statute.  Therefore, injured workers 
who have been forced to pay exorbitant amounts of money to the state under the 
1995 subrogation statute may now have some legitimate relief in sight. 
Contained in this section is a brief discussion of the pertinent facts behind Holton 
v. Crouse Cargtage Company, and a detailed explanation of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s decision in the matter.  In ruling Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation 
statute unconstitutional, the court began by noting that the concept of subrogation 
was valid.49  However, the court found that parts of sections 4123.931(A) and 
4123.931(D) of the statute directly interfered with a claimant’s constitutional 
rights.50  The majority’s decision as to the unconstitutionality of the subrogation 
statute is discussed below.  
A.  The Facts in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company 
On June 18, 1998, plaintiff Rick Holeton was injured in the course and scope of 
his employment with Harper Structures.51  At the time of his accident, Mr. Holeton 
worked as part of a construction crew in the process of building an overpass across 
the Ohio Turnpike.52  A truck, owned and operated by defendants James Parr and 
                                                                
45FULTON, supra note 6.  
46Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.93 (D)).  This provision of section 4123.931 
thereby differentiated between a claimant who takes his or her claim to court, and a claimant 
who decides to settle out of court. 
47Bashein, supra note 19, at 5-7. 
48Id. 
49See infra text accompanying notes 62, 63. 
50See infra text accompanying notes 67, 73. 
51Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1113.  
52Id.  
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Crouse Cartage Company, struck the telescoping man-lift bucket in which Mr. 
Holeton was standing.53  The force of the impact propelled Mr. Holeton out of the 
bucket, thrusting him into the underside of the overpass and then dropping him onto 
the highway below, leaving him seriously injured.54   
Since Mr. Holeton’s injuries occurred in the course and scope of his employment 
with Harper Structures, he received and may indefinitely continue to receive, 
workers’ compensation benefits from the Bureau.55  At the time of this decision, Mr. 
Holeton received over $190,000 in wage and medical benefits from the Bureau.56   
Mr. Holeton sued Crouse Cartage Company for his personal injuries, and the 
Bureau asserted a subrogation claim against any settlement or judgment Mr. Holeton 
might receive by or on behalf of the defendants, pursuant to Ohio’s workers’ 
compensation subrogation statute, Ohio Revised Code section 4123.931.57  Plaintiffs 
Rick Holeton, his spouse Shari Holeton, and his two minor children disputed the 
validity of the Bureau’s subrogation claim and argued that the subrogation statute 
violated relevant sections of Ohio’s Constitution.58  The majority opinion by Justice 
Alice Robie Resnick resolved the court’s eight-part inquiry into the statute’s 
constitutional and legal validity.59  The court held that “the law violates a 
constitutional provision against the government’s taking of private property without 
just compensation and runs counter to constitutional guarantees of remedy for an 
injury by due course of the law and equal protection.”60   
B.  Attacking the Concept of Subrogation 
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio ultimately decided that Ohio’s subrogation 
statute was unconstitutional, the court began its discussion by rejecting two specific 
arguments made by the Plaintiff, discussed below.61  By addressing these arguments 
first, the court effectively laid the foundation for their future support of a 
constitutionally sound subrogation statute.  Additionally, by first rejecting these 
broad and overarching assertions, the court enabled itself to move into a more 
specified look at the subrogation statute.   
First, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Mr. Holeton’s assertion that a 
subrogation statute is inherently unconstitutional on its face, by noting that virtually 
every state has some type of subrogation statute enabling a state fund or an employer 
                                                                
53Id. at 1114.  
54Id.   
55Id.  
56Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1114.  
57Id.  
58Id.  The Bureau, in response, denied that the subrogation statute was unconstitutional and 
sought to enforce its subrogation rights under section 4123.931.  
59Communications Office of Ohio Supreme Court, Supreme Court Strikes Workers’ 
Compensation Subrogation Statute (June 27, 2001).  
60Id.  
61Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1117.  
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to recover paid benefits and compensation.62  To support this position, Justice 
Resnick stated that “[a]ny decision that would hold the mere concept of subrogation 
or reimbursement per se invalid in the workers’ compensation context would 
constitute a legal anomaly.”63   
Second, the court noted that Ohio’s subrogation statute does not operate to reduce 
an injured employee’s workers’ compensation benefits in any way.64  Justice Resnick 
stated that even though the statute may diminish or extinguish a claimant’s tort 
recovery irrespective of whether a double recovery had occurred, the statute does 
nothing to the claimant’s workers’ compensation recovery; “the claimant is always 
left with the full measure of compensation and benefits to which he or she is entitled 
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.”65  Although these assertions were rejected, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio ultimately decided that Ohio’s subrogation statute was 
unconstitutional, as it specifically violated Article I, sections 2, 16, and 19 of the 
Ohio Constitution.66 
C.  Estimated Future Values of Compensation and Medical Benefits 
The Supreme Court of Ohio found that Ohio’s workers’ compensation 
subrogation statute impermissibly gave the statutory subrogee a claim to recover 
estimated future values of compensation and medical benefits under section 
4123.931(A), and was, therefore, unconstitutional. 67  Justice Resnick stated: 
By giving the subrogee a current collectible interest in estimated future 
expenditures, R.C. 4123.931(A) creates conditions under which a 
prohibited taking may occur.  This would happen in those situations 
where the amount of reimbursement for “estimated future values of 
compensation and medical benefits” proves to be substantially greater 
than the subrogee’s eventual compensation outlay.68   
For example, a claimant may die before collecting the entire expected and estimated 
amount of compensation, and therefore, the subrogee would receive money never 
actually paid to the claimant.69   
Additionally, in discussing wrongful death situations, the court illustrated another 
prime example of when the amount of reimbursement for estimated future values 
proves to be greater than the subrogee’s eventual compensation outlay:   
                                                                
62Id. 
63Id. 
64Id.  
65Id. 
66Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129.  
67Id. at 1119.  
68Id.  In other words, O.R.C. 4123.931(A) requires the claimant to reimburse the Bureau 
for future benefits that the claimant may never receive.  
69Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP, Subrogation Unconstitutional, LEGAL NEWS (July 2001) 
available at http://www.calfee.com/news. 
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[I]n a wrongful death situation where the decedent leaves a surviving 
spouse—say, a woman in her thirties or forties . . . the BWC or self-
insured employer will calculate estimated future benefits based upon the 
. . . woman’s life expectancy.  However, if the woman remarries, she will 
cease to be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits upon remarriage 
. . . in those circumstances, if the subrogee has recovered estimated future 
benefits based upon the woman’s life expectancy, and she remarries 
shortly thereafter, the statute endows the subrogee with an enormous 
windfall at the expense of the injured party.70   
The majority stated that in these types of events, which occur all too often, the 
subrogation statute does not operate to prevent the claimant from receiving a double 
recovery, but instead provides the statutory subrogee with monies that the claimant 
never actually received, thus frequently resulting in a windfall.71  The court 
considered this potential windfall for the statutory subrogee at the expense of the 
claimant tantamount to an unlawful taking of the claimant’s property, which violates 
Article I, sections 16 and 19 of the Ohio Constitution.72  
D.  Distinguishing Between Settlements and Judgments 
Additionally, the court found that Ohio’s workers’ compensation subrogation 
statute impermissibly establishes a procedural framework that distinguishes between 
third-party claims that are tried in court and third-party claims that are settled under 
section 4123.931(D).73  Simply speaking, workers’ compensation benefits cover only 
certain types of injuries to the specific claimant.74  It does not cover any additional 
damages that may surround the claimant’s accident (i.e., pain and suffering).75  
Under section 4123.931(D), if a claimant decided to try his or her case against a 
third-party tortfeasor, he or she would be able to obtain jury interrogatories in which 
he or she would be able to request the jury to categorize the various types of 
damages, and separating those damages that represent workers’ compensation or 
medical benefits and those that do not, thereby, protecting certain damages from 
being subject to subrogation.76  If, on the other hand, a claimant decided to settle his 
claim outside of court, the entire amount of settlement or compromise is subject to 
the reimbursement right of the statutory subrogee, and the claimant is precluded 
under section 4123.931(D) from showing that certain portions of the settlement or 
compromise do not represent or duplicate benefits and compensation paid out by the 
Bureau or a self-insured employer.77  Therefore, Ohio’s subrogation statute 
                                                                
70Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1119-20. 
71Id. at 1119.  
72Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP, supra note 69. 
73Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121.   
74See generally Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121-23.  
75Id.  
76Id. at 1121.  See also Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
77Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121.  See also Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
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impermissibly and unconstitu-tionally discriminated between claimants who settled 
third party tort actions and those who tried their cases to a jury.78  
Additionally, Justice Resnick noted that often times the actual combined amount 
of the workers’ compensation benefits and settlement recovery is insufficient to 
cover all of a claimant’s loss, and “[i]t can hardly be said that a double recovery 
results when a tort victim is allowed to retain two recoveries that, when combined, 
still do not make him or her whole.”79  The court decided that the settlement problem 
in section 4123.931(D) amounted to an unconstitutional taking, a violation of due 
process, and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in Article I, § 2, as it 
distinguished between injured workers who go to trial and those who settle.80  The 
Equal Protection violation is based on the settlement language of the statute, which 
essentially presumes a double recovery occurs whenever a claimant retains workers’ 
compensation and tort damages, and “claimants who try their claims are permitted to 
rebut this presumption while claimants who settle their tort claims are not.”81   
E  One Final Statement by the Supreme Court of Ohio 
Mr. Holeton asserted five other grounds under which Ohio’s subrogation statute 
should be held unconstitutional, all of which were summarily struck down by the 
Supreme Court of Ohio.82  Importantly, the court stated, “[i]n so holding, we do not 
accept the proposition that a workers’ compensation subrogation statute is per se 
unconstitutional, and nothing in the opinion shall be construed to prevent the General 
Assembly from ever enacting such a statute.  We only hold that R.C. 4123.931, in its 
present form, is unconstitutional.”83   
After the Supreme Court of Ohio’s split decision in Holeton, three judges offered 
a blistering dissent.84 Additionally, the Bureau promptly filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration in an attempt to preserve the workers’ compensation subrogation 
statute in Ohio.85  By examining and considering those various arguments and 
competing views, this Note asserts that the majority in Holeton correctly ruled that 
Ohio’s subrogation statute stands in violation of the Ohio Constitution.   
IV.  COMPETING VIEWS ON SUBROGATION RIGHTS IN OHIO:  THE HOLETON  
DISSENT AND THE BUREAU’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Due to the great importance of subrogation rights in the workers’ compensation 
context, the Holeton decision stirred up a great deal of controversy in Ohio.  The 
                                                                
78Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1121-22. 
79Id. at 1122. 
80Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
81Communications Office of Ohio Supreme Court, Supreme Court Strikes Workers’ 
Compensation Subrogation Statute (June 27, 2001). 
82Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129. 
83Id. at 1129.  
84See id (Moyer, J., dissenting) 
85See Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation, Holteon v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001) (No. 00-428). 
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dissenting justices and the Bureau argued intensely against the majority’s decision, 
perhaps predicting the onslaught of arguments that would arise regarding the refund 
of subrogation monies following the majority’s decision.  After an examination of 
each specific argument from both sources, however, it becomes clear that the 
majority’s decision in Holeton was correct, and the Supreme Court of Ohio was 
justified in denying the Bureau’s Motion.  This conclusion effectively allows the 
injured workers of Ohio to continue on their path towards reimbursement.   
A.  The Dissent’s Arguments 
The dissent’s first argument is based on “[t]he principle that courts are not the 
creators of public policy and should not decide cases based on a disagreement with 
[the] legislature . . . .”86  The dissenting justices in Holeton accused the majority of 
overstepping its role and substituting themselves for the General Assembly of Ohio, 
thereby, basing their decision on their own legislative policy preferences.87  In the 
dissent, Justice Moyer stated, “[t]he majority’s determination . . . appears to derive 
from its disagreement with the substance of legislation.  The reasons stated for 
declaring the statute unconstitutional are generally policy arguments, not principles 
of constitutional law.”88   
Second, the dissent saw no constitutional problem with letting the Bureau or a 
self-insured employer collect estimated future costs as part of its subrogation claim 
against an injured employee’s recovery.89  The dissent noted that no estimate is ever 
going to be absolutely perfect, and even though future costs may sometimes be 
overestimated, they are often underestimated.90  For example, the court stated that 
although there were circumstances in which an employee may die before receiving 
benefits equal to the amount of subrogation, there were also circumstances in which 
an employee may live beyond their life expectancy.91  Justice Moyer added that in 
determining future values, the court “hears evidence from both the claimant and the 
subrogee, and may reject the subrogee’s projections if it finds them not well 
supported . . . [c]ourts routinely estimate the value of future payments in these cases, 
aided by expert testimony, mortality tables, and formulas for reducing future 
payments to present value.”92   
Third, the dissenting justices argued that no fundamental constitutional right of 
an employee was violated because of the treatment of settlements differently than 
judgments awarded after a trial.93  Justice Moyer supported this proposal by stating 
“[i]f an employee is dissatisfied with settlement policies, the employee may proceed 
with a jury trial . . . R.C. 4123.931 does not force employees to litigate . . . like all 
                                                                
86Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129. 
87Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
88Holeton, 748 N.E.2d. at 1129.  
89Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4.  
90Holeton, 738 N.E.2d at 1130 (Moyer, J., dissenting); Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
91Holeton, 738 N.E.2d at 1130 (Moyer, J., dissenting). 
92Id. at 1130.  
93Denlinger, supra note 7, at 4. 
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claimants, injured employees are free to decide whether to proceed to trial or to 
settle.”94 
Finally, Justice Cook’s dissent stated that the majority’s decision stood “for the 
bizarre and unsupportable proposition that a court may declare a statute 
unconstitutional on its face simply because it may be applied unconstitutionally in 
some cases.”95  Justice Cook believed that the majority’s decision to declare the 
statute facially unconstitutional fell short of the difficult standard required for this 
type of challenge; even though a statute may operate unconstitutionally in some 
circumstances, that is not sufficient to render it completely void.96   
As stated in the preceding arguments, the dissenting Justices in Holeton would 
have upheld the subrogation statute’s constitutionality by attacking the majority’s 
decision and the methodology employed to arrive at that decision.  Additionally, the 
Bureau promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration after the decision in Holeton.97  
Discussed below are various arguments made by the Bureau that are similar to those 
arguments made by the dissent in Holeton, but also unique in certain situations. 
B.  The Bureau’s Motion for Reconsideration’s Arguments 
First, the Bureau argued that section 4123.931 was rationally based because the 
statute furthered a legitimate legislative objective.98  The Bureau felt that the 
majority in Holeton simply declared Ohio’s subrogation statute unconstitutional 
based upon two potential and hypothetical situations that may arise in a case where 
subrogation rights are asserted.99  Furthermore, the Bureau argued that the majority 
overlooked the fact that there are circumstances under which the subrogation statute 
benefited the claimant, and fulfilled the legislature’s intent of preventing a double 
recovery.100 
Second, the Bureau argued that section 4123.931(D) did not violate equal 
protection guarantees of claimants who settled their tort claims, but simply precluded 
the parties from colluding to prevent subrogation.101  In the case of those claimants 
                                                                
94Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1131.  Additionally, the dissent stated that “[e]ach process has its 
own advantages and disadvantages, and the employee must decide whether to submit his or 
her claim to a trial that would determine the portion of the award that should be shielded from 
subrogation, or to settle with the tortfeasor, taking into consideration that the settlement 
amount will be subject to subrogation.”  Id. at 1131-32. 
95Id. at 1133 (Cook, J., dissenting).   
96Id.  Additionally, Justice Cook felt that the majority needed to consider many more 
additional situations before declaring the statute facially unconstitutional or invalid in toto; 
simply finding the statute invalid in a few circumstances is not enough.  Id.  Justice Cook also 
noted that the majority’s analysis fell short of this exhaustive standard.  Id. 
97See supra note 85. 
98See Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
at 2, Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001) (No. 00-428). 
99See id. at 4. 
100See id.  
101See id. at  7 (“The provision that any settlement is presumed to represent amounts 
subject to subrogation will not necessarily work to the detriment of the plaintiff, as the court 
assumes . . . without such a provision, the subrogee’s interests are not protected.”).  
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who go to trial, the statute allowed the jury to determine the amounts and types of 
damages.102  In the case of settlement, the statute simply made it a practical necessity 
to involve the subrogee in negotiations, thereby, allowing the subrogee to look after 
his or her interests.103   
One last notable argument from the Bureau involved the idea of severability.  
The Bureau argued that even if portions of section 4123.931 were deemed 
unconstitutional, the subrogation statute itself was not.104  Therefore, the Bureau 
asserted that the few portions of the statute deemed unconstitutional should be 
severed and the remaining portions should remain intact since that was the intent of 
the legislature.105 
The arguments presented by the dissenting justices and the Bureau demonstrate 
the mixed emotions and conflicting ideas the Holeton decision created.  Deep 
examination of these preceding arguments, however, leads to the conclusion that the 
majority’s decision in Holeton was correct. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
correctly denied the Bureau’s Motion for Reconsideration, thereby making Holeton 
the law.   
C.  Examination of the Dissent’s Arguments 
The dissenting justices began with the argument that the majority substituted 
themselves for the General Assembly, making policy arguments instead of 
constitutional law arguments.106  This argument is generally flawed, as the majority 
took great pains to compare throughout the entire decision many facets of the 
subrogation statute to the applicable areas of constitutional law.107  By examining 
hypothetical situations that commonly arise in workers’ compensation situations, the 
majority found clear violations of specific provisions of the Ohio Constitution.108  
Additionally, in the last paragraph of the decision, the majority urged the General 
Assembly to enact a subrogation statute that would be constitutionally sound.109  The 
majority did not substitute itself for the General Assembly, but simply informed the 
General Assembly that the present statute is unconstitutional and needs to be 
revised.110  The majority made no recommendations, nor any policy arguments.  
They simply stated how the present statute violated common law notions embedded 
in the Ohio Constitution, actually leaving the rest up to the actual General Assembly.   
The dissenting justices went on to argue that no future estimate is perfect, and 
although estimates may sometimes be overestimated, they are often 
                                                                
102See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 9, Holeton (No. 00-428). 
103Id.  Such a provision is not unconstitutional, but serves the legitimate governmental 
interest of promoting a full and equitable resolution of a subrogation claim.  Id.    
104See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 10, Holeton (No. 00-428). 
105See id. 
106Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1129-30.  
107See generally, Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1119-24. 
108Id. 
109See id. at 1129. 
110Id. 
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underestimated.111  The dissent failed, however, to see the magnitude of its reasoning 
because a constitutional violation will always occur when future values of 
compensation and benefits are overestimated, thus resulting in a windfall for the 
subrogee.112  Simply stating that underestimations occur does not relieve the notion 
that overestimations often result in constitutional violations.  Therefore, the resulting 
windfall to the statutory subrogee in these circumstances needs to be eliminated.  
Since no estimate formulated by a court is going to be perfect, a new statute that 
implements new methods is needed to prevent a statutory subrogee from collecting 
in situations where an obvious unconstitutional taking has occurred. 
The dissenting justices also stated that a claimant is not forced to settle because 
he or she always has the chance to litigate and therefore take full advantage of jury 
interrogatories to categorize damages.113  An effective counter-argument to this 
proposition, however, is that it is not true that every claimant has the money, means, 
or time to litigate their respective claims.  It is naïve to believe that all claimants 
have the unfettered opportunity to try their claims.  By discriminating between those 
claimants who do and those who do not try their claims, a clear violation of equal 
protection rights takes place.  Additionally, the majority points out that trying a case 
to have damages designated does not obviate the potential problems in these types of 
situations.114  The fact that a claimant has the legal ability to try their case does not 
mean they will have the means to do so.  Moreover, it does not mean a double 
recovery will not still occur in the process. 
The final argument made by Justice Cook is perhaps the most persuasive of the 
dissent’s arguments.  Justice Cook believed that although a statute may operate 
unconstitutionally in some circumstances, it is insufficient to render the statute 
completely void on its face.115  Although the majority considered only a few 
instances where the statute operated unconstitutionally, they explained that situations 
and circumstances like those mentioned in the opinion happen frequently in the 
workers’ compensation context, and it is the subrogation statute that creates those 
situations by virtue of its classifications and presumptions.116  The majority 
considered the repeated and familiar circumstances that often arise between the 
common law and the subrogation statute to determine that the statute was not related 
to its presumed goal of preventing double recoveries.117  It is impossible for a court 
to consider every possible circumstance that may arise with respect to the 
subrogation statute.  Therefore, in considering a few of the most often occurring 
situations, the majority demonstrated that the subrogation statute worked 
                                                                
111Id. at 1130 (Moyer, J., dissenting). 
112Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1119. 
113Id. at 1131 (Moyer, J., dissenting). 
114Id. at 1124 (“Despite any allocation of damages, the claimant’s tort recovery is still 
fixed by the insurance policy limits, the combined amount of those limits and workers’ 
compensation is still insufficient to cover the claimant’s actual total loss, and there is still no 
double recovery to justify a right of subrogation to any of the insurance proceeds.”).  
115Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1133 (Cook, J., dissenting).  
116Id. at 1125. 
117Id. 
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unconstitutionally.118  Although the statute is appropriate in some situations, 
important sections of the statute work directly against the Ohio Constitution.119 
Therefore, the majority correctly held that Ohio’s workers’ compensation 
subrogation statute violates the Ohio Constitution. 
The arguments in response to the majority’s decision in Holeton continued when 
the Bureau set forth a few more arguments in their Motion for Reconsideration.  
Unfortunately, these arguments found little merit with the Supreme Court of Ohio.  
Consequently, the court denied the motion.  Through an examination of the Bureau’s 
three main arguments, the flaws become quite apparent.   
D.  Examination of the Bureau’s Motion for Reconsideration 
The Bureau agreed with the dissent and believed that the majority overlooked the 
fact that there are circumstances under which the subrogation statute works to the 
benefit of the claimant and fulfills the legislature’s intent of preventing a double 
recovery; thus, the Bureau argues the statute has a rational basis.120  The statute’s 
operation, however, does not aid the government’s interest in preventing double 
recoveries, because, in attempting to achieve that goal, constitutional violations 
occur quite regularly in numerous claims.121  As mentioned previously, just because 
the statute works in some circumstances does not mean that it should deduct monies 
from claimants and produce a windfall for subrogees in other circumstances.122  The 
subrogation statute is both arbitrary and irrational in a wide variety of circumstances. 
The Bureau’s Motion also claimed that section 4123.931(D) did not violate equal 
protection guarantees of claimants who settled their tort claims, but simply precluded 
the parties from colluding to prevent subrogation.123  The majority’s arguments 
regarding settlements and judgments under the statute, however, make it clear that 
section 4123.931 created a level of discrimination between claimants.124  When the 
Bureau stated that section 4123.931(D) simply worked to keep parties from 
colluding to prevent subrogation, they only examined the tip of the iceberg.  As 
previously examined, section 4123.931(D) worked unconstitutionally in many ways 
and cannot be viewed with such simplicity. 
Lastly, the Bureau asserted that the court deemed two specific phrases, but not 
the entire statute, in section 4123.931 unconstitutional.  Therefore, the entire statute 
should not have been declared unconstitutional, and only the unconstitutional 
portions should have been severed.125  This argument initially fails because the 
Bureau did not previously raise the issue of severability, and they should not be 
                                                                
118Id. 
119Id. 
120See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 4, Holeton (No. 00-428). 
121Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1125. 
122Id. 
123See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 7, Holeton (No. 00-428). 
124See supra text accompanying note 114. 
125See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration at 10, Holeton (No. 00-428). 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/6
2002-03] SUBROGATION IN OHIO 89 
permitted to raise this issue at so late a juncture.126  Moreover, Holeton argued that 
the subrogation statute “represents a highly integrated, comprehensive treatment of 
subrogation rights . . . [i]t is simply not possible to sever [a provision] . . . and still 
remain true to the legislative intent.”127  This argument, therefore, lacks merit and 
can be dismissed. 
Although the holding of Holeton is correct, issues still surround the state of 
subrogation in Ohio.  Because the 1995 statute has been effectively ruled 
unconstitutional, the Bureau and self-insured employers no longer enjoy subrogation 
rights under Ohio’s statutory scheme.  However, one of the many post-Holeton 
arguments revolves around whether the 1993 subrogation statute is now revived with 
the fall of the 1995 statute.  This argument is fully examined in the following section.   
V.  IN THE AFTERMATH OF HOLETON:  IS THE FORMER SUBROGATION  
STATUTE REVIVED? 
Directly following the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Holeton, questions 
began forming as to what subrogation rights, if any, the Bureau now possessed.  One 
of the strongest arguments focused on the revival of the 1993 subrogation statute, 
which would effectively give the Bureau all subrogation powers it retained under the 
old statute.128  Although the general view is that the 1993 subrogation statute is not 
revived, the Bureau has not taken a position on it.  This section asserts that for 
various constitutional, statutory, and legislative intent-driven reasons, the 1993 
statute should not be revived.  Moreover, if the statute was ever revived, it should 
fail for the same constitutional reasons that led to the demise of the 1995 statute.  
Therefore, since the Bureau cannot assert any subrogation powers under this line of 
argument, the injured workers of Ohio have an increasingly better chance at having 
the millions of dollars unconstitutionally taken by the state finally returned to them.  
A.  The Argument for Revival of the 1993 Subrogation Statute 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision to rule the 1995 subrogation statute 
unconstitutional has major implications as to whether the 1993 statute should be in 
effect.  The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained the consequences and impact of 
ruling a statute unconstitutional, stating that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it 
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it 
is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”129  
Since section 4123.931 is to be treated as a legal nullity, “the ruling of Holeton is to 
be applied retroactively and the statute must be viewed as never having any force or 
                                                                
126Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, at 4-5, 
Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111  (Ohio 2001) (No. 00-428). 
127Id. “[S]ince the statute defines BWC’s subrogation interest in an omnibus fashion that 
includes both past and future wages and medical benefits, the provision dealing with 
subrogation of future benefits is entirely essential to (and inseparable from) the balance of the 
statute.”  Id.   
128Telephone Interview with Suzanne Stocker, Esq. (Dec.-Jan. 2001-02) (hereinafter 
Stocker). 
129Rhonda Gail Davis, The Aftermath of Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company: The Status 
of Workers Compensation Subrogation, at 9 (Aug. 9, 2001) (unpublished) (citing Middleton v. 
Ferguson, 25 Ohio St. 3d 71, 80 (1986)). 
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effect.”130  Therefore, the 1995 subrogation statute should be viewed as if it never 
existed, leaving the possibility that the 1993 subrogation statute is revived. 
The strongest argument for revival of the 1993 statute is based upon the notion 
that when the 1995 statute was ruled unconstitutional and invalid, the provisions that 
repealed the 1993 statute were also made invalid, therefore, reviving the 1993 
statute.131  In a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Sullivan, 132 
the court held that  
[W]hen a court strikes down a statute as unconstitutional, and the 
offending statute replaced an existing law that had been repealed in the 
same bill that enacted the offending statute, the repeal is also invalid 
unless it clearly appears that the General Assembly meant the repeal to 
have effect even if the offending statute had never been passed.133   
The argument here is that the enactment of the offending statute via House Bill 278, 
section 4123.931, replaced an existing law, the former section 4123.93, which was 
repealed in that same bill.  Therefore, under the court’s logic in Sullivan, the repeal 
of the former section 4123.93 also became invalid when the court ruled section 
4123.931 unconstitutional. This rationale leaves the former 1993 subrogation statute 
in full effect.   
Although they are not taking a firm position on the matter, the Bureau and self-
insured employers can use this case law to argue that the Holeton decision revived 
the 1993 statute, and that version of the statute is now in full force.134  There are, 
however, many arguments that support the proposition that the 1993 statute cannot 
be revived.  These arguments, along with the unconstitutionality of the 1993 statute, 
make it apparent that the 1993 subrogation statute should not be revived. 
B. The Constitutional Argument Against Revival 
The basis for a major argument against the possible revival of the 1993 
subrogation statute lies in the Ohio Constitution.  Article II, § 15(D) of the Ohio 
Constitution states that “[n]o law shall be revived or amended unless the new act 
contains the entire act revived, or the section or sections amended, and the section or 
sections amended shall be repealed.”135  This provision of the Constitution arose as 
early as 1917, in State, ex rel. Godfrey v. O’Brien.136  In that decision, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio noted that this provision of the Ohio Constitution is mandatory, stating 
that “it is clear that this provision of the Constitution, requiring each new act to 
contain the entire act revived, or the section or sections amended, is mandatory; 
                                                                
130Bashein, supra note 19, at 8  (citing Peerless Electric Co. vs. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467, 
468 (1955)). 
131Bashein, supra note 19, at 10.   
132739 N.E.2d 788, 794 (Ohio 2001). 
133Id. at 794; see also Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467 (Ohio 1955); Pogue v. 
Groom, 109 N.E. 477 (Ohio 1914). 
134Bashein, supra note 19, at 10.   
135Id. (citing OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(D)). 
136115 N.E. 25 (Ohio 1917). 
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otherwise repealed sections must be given the same force and effect as if they were 
not in fact appealed.”137  The court further mentioned that if reference may be made 
to statutes expressly repealed by the legislature, reference could be made to a statute 
that was repealed half a century ago.138  Not only is this extremely impractical, but it 
is expressly prevented by this provision of the Ohio Constitution.139  
More recently, in State, ex rel. Judy v. Wandstrat,140 the Court of Appeals for the 
First District of Ohio held that when a statute that effectively repealed earlier 
enactments was found to be unconstitutional, that determination would not operate to 
revive earlier enactments, due to the provision of Article II, § 15(D) of the Ohio 
Constitution.141  Therefore, in order to revive the 1993 subrogation statute, the 
General Assembly must pass a new act that contains the relevant portions of the 
former 1993 subrogation statute.142  The case law in tune with State v. Sullivan, 
which supports revival of the 1993 statute, fails to address this important and 
mandatory Constitutional provision that effectively bars revival.143   
In addition to this Constitutional provision that prevents revival, an argument 
may be made as to what the intent of the legislature was when they enacted House 
Bill 278 and, specifically, section 4123.931.  The Bureau and self-insured employers 
may argue that the General Assembly definitely intended to have a subrogation 
statute in place, but through an examination of the language contained in House Bill 
278, the legislature’s true intent becomes apparent. 
C.  The General Assembly’s Intent  
By examining section 10 of House Bill 278, it becomes apparent that the General 
Assembly did not attend the 1993 statute to be revived as a consequence of the 1995 
statute being held unconstitutional.144  In section 10 of House Bill 278 the General 
Assembly stated that “[t]he sections of this act, and every part of such sections, are 
hereby declared to be independent sections and parts of sections, and the holding of 
any section or part thereof to be void and ineffective shall not effect any other 
section or parts of sections.”145  This supports the rationale that just because the court 
ruled section 4123.931 unconstitutional and void does not mean that the repeal 
                                                                
137Id. at 28.  Accordingly, the court states that “[t]he repeal of a statute is the end of that 
statute. To all extents and purposes it is the same as if it never existed.”  Id.; see also Bashein, 
supra note 19, at 10.  
138State, ex rel. Godfrey, 115 N.E. at 28. 
139Id. 
140577 N.E.2d 364 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist 1989). 
141Id. at 366.  “The passage of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 390 effectively repealed these earlier 
enactments, and a determination by this court that Am.Sub.H.B. was unconstitutional would 
not operate to revive them.”  Id.; see also Bashein, supra note 19, at 10-11.   
142Bashein, supra note 19, at 11.   
143Id. at 10.   
144See id. at 12. 
145Id. (citing section 10 of House Bill 278).  
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provisions of the House Bill 278146 may also be considered void.  The express intent 
of the legislature is that the repeal provisions should be left alone, even if certain 
parts of the Bill are held unconstitutional.147   
Moreover, as stated previously in Sullivan, a repeal will be considered invalid 
unless it is clear that the General Assembly meant the repeal to persist even if the 
offending statute had never been passed.148  The General Assembly’s directions in 
section 10 of House Bill 278 clearly show that the Assembly intended the repeal 
provisions to remain unharmed, and thereby prevent the 1993 subrogation statute 
from ever being revived.149  
It is apparent that the 1993 statute cannot be revived while staying true to Ohio 
Constitutional Law and the General Assembly’s express intent.  Additionally, 
because the 1993 subrogation statute was so worthless and ineffective, the General 
Assembly had to enact a broader, more productive statute in 1995.  Therefore, it may 
be argued that the General Assembly could never have intended the 1993 statute to 
be revived, as it is inherently weaker than its successor.150  With that in mind, it can 
be concluded that the 1993 subrogation statute should be considered unconstitutional 
for the same reasons as the 1995 statute.   
D.  The Unconstitutionality of the 1993 Subrogation Statute 
If the 1993 statute were revived, a challenge to its relevant sections under the 
Ohio Constitution would be the most effective method at proving the statute’s 
invalidity.151  As discussed in previous sections, the 1993 subrogation statute was 
intended to preclude double recoveries, but in actuality it accomplished even less 
than the 1995 statute.152  For example, the Bureau or a self insured employer had no 
subrogation rights in any of the following instances: out of court settlements, 
recoveries from the employee’s own motorist insurance policy, wrongful death 
actions, or when the employee’s reasonable attorney fees and court costs exceeded 
the workers’ compensation benefits paid.153  Therefore, like the 1995 subrogation 
statute, the 1993 statute “indiscriminately required subrogation claims to be paid in 
only limited instances and without regard to the actual amount of any ‘double 
recovery’ received by the injured worker.”154  This type of action amounts to 
                                                                
146Section 2 contains the provision that effectively repealed the former subrogation statute, 
§ 4123.93.  
147See Bashein, supra note 19, at 11.   
148Sullivan, 739 N.E.2d at 794.  
149See H.R. 278, 310 124th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). 
150Bashein, supra note 19, at 14.  “[T]he readily apparent loopholes, incongruities, and 
uncertainties created by H.B. 107 prompted the passage of H.B. 278. In many respects, the 
earlier legislation is even more unfair and inequitable than the General Assembly’s latest 
effort to create subrogation rights in Ohio.” Id. 
151Bashein, supra note 19, at 15.  
152Id.  
153Id. at 15-16. 
154Id. at 16. 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/6
2002-03] SUBROGATION IN OHIO 93 
prohibited taking, which is against the constitutional ideals of private property due 
process.155 
In ruling the 1995 statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Ohio found 
serious equal protection problems in the 1995 statute’s differing treatment of 
claimants who decide to settle their claims and those who try their claims in court.156  
Similarly, by discriminating between claimants in the different instances mentioned 
above, the 1993 subrogation statute violated a claimant’s equal protection rights in 
an intensified offensive manner.157  This statute cannot satisfy the high equal 
protection standards that the Holeton decision promoted.158  When the 1993 statute is 
held to the analysis of Holeton, it becomes apparent that this statute is inherently 
flawed and it should not be revived.159   
The Holeton decision effectively gutted Ohio’s subrogation statute of any type of 
subrogation power, leaving only worthless definitions.160  Additionally, as a result of 
the preceding arguments, it is readily apparent that the 1993 statute should remain 
repealed indefinitely.161  Therefore, Ohio is currently in a position similar to what it 
was in before subrogation rights existed in Ohio.162  However, the difference lies in 
the fact that the Bureau and self-insured employers have been unjustifiably collecting 
subrogation funds from claimants for several years under a subrogation statute that 
has been held to be unconstitutional and is therefore non-existent.163  Under this 
premise, it seems proper that the Bureau should be forced to refund all funds 
improperly taken under an unconstitutional subrogation statute.   
VI.  THE FINAL STEPS:  REFUND OF SUBROGATION PAYMENTS AND  
A NEW SUBROGATION STATUTE  
The Bureau and self-insured employers enjoyed the luxury of collecting over 
fifty million dollars from the injured workers of Ohio since 1995.164  These monies 
were taken regardless of whether a double recovery actually occurred and in 
apparent confliction with the Ohio Constitution.  Now they’re being unjustly 
retained.  The Bureau should be required to repay these monies that were 
unconstitutionally taken.  Only then can the state of Ohio move into the future and 
create a new subrogation statute that is both fair to the injured worker and keeps the 
subrogation rights of the Bureau in mind.   
                                                                
155Id.  
156Bashein, supra note 19, at 16.  See also, Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1130.  
157See Bashein, supra note 19, at 17. 
158Id.  
159Id. 
160Rhonda Gail Davis, The Aftermath of Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company: The Status 
of Workers Compensation Subrogation, at 4 (Aug. 9, 2001) (unpublished). 
161See supra Sections V.B, V.C, V.D. 
162Bashein, supra note 19, at 13. 
163Id. at 17. 
164See infra text accompanying note 166. 
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This section begins with an introduction as to the Bureau’s position on refunding 
subrogation payments, and the main argument that is being asserted in a pending 
class action lawsuit dealing with the matter, Santos v. Bureau of Workers 
Compensation.165  This section asserts that the court of common pleas is the correct 
court to grant this type of equitable relief, and specific cases will be examined that 
provide the remedy sought in this class action.166  Moreover, this section asserts that 
a total refund of subrogated funds is appropriate under an equitable principle of 
restitution.167  This section concludes with a discussion as to the creation of a new 
subrogation statute in Ohio.168 
A.  The Bureau’s Position on Refund of Subrogation Payments 
Although the Bureau has collected approximately fifty million dollars from 
injured Ohio citizens based upon an unconstitutional subrogation statute, the Bureau 
has made no move to refund any of the money.169  Moreover, even in light of the 
Holeton decision, the Bureau has not stated that it will cease and desist all 
subrogation activities throughout the state of Ohio in all circumstances.170  
Additionally, the Bureau did not indicate it would refund the monies it had 
unlawfully taken from injured workers through application of an unconstitutional 
subrogation statute.171   
B.  The Class Action Lawsuit 
This firm position maintained by the Bureau is currently being attacked in a class 
action lawsuit, Santos v. Bureau of Workers Compensation, pending in the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals.172  The attorneys for the class 173 are arguing that the state 
of Ohio should be enjoined from asserting any subrogation rights under the now 
unconstitutional statute.174  Additionally, the Bureau should be responsible for 
                                                                
165See infra text accompanying note 169-72.  
166See infra Section VI.B. 
167See infra Section VI.C. 
168See infra Section VI.D. 
169Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, Angel L. Santos, et al., at 1,9, Santos v. Bureau of 
Workers’ Comp. (Ohio Ct. App. filed July 13, 2001) (No. 80353). 
170Id. at 2. 
171Id. 
172No. 80535 (Ohio Ct. App. filed July 13, 2001).  This class action lawsuit is being 
brought by Craig Bashein and Paul Flowers (among others), whose unpublished seminar 
materials provided a great deal of information used to construct this Note. 
173The protected classes are “[a]ll workers who have established, or are in the process of 
establishing, intentional tort claims against their employers where subrogation rights have 
been or are being asserted under R.C. 4123.931 with respect to any civil recovery secured 
from the tortfeasor” and “[a]ll workers who are or have been subject to subrogation claims, 
other than those based on intentional tort claims, asserted by authority of R.C. 4123.931.”  
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, Angel L. Santos, et al., at 3, Santos (No. 80353).   
174Bashein, supra note 19, at 19. 
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refunding all payments received as a result of the improper application of the section 
4123.931.175  
Therefore, a decision was made in the Santos class action lawsuit to file in the 
court of common pleas.  To undertand why suit was filed in the court of common 
pleas, it is extremely important to clarify that the class action complaint contains no 
request for monetary damages against the Bureau.176  The complaint asserts “the 
government is obtaining these monies unlawfully pursuant to an unconstitutional 
statute, and seeks an equitable order requiring the government to disgorge the money 
it obtained . . . such a case is not a claim for legal damages, but for equitable 
relief.”177  The Plaintiffs in this class action correctly argue that the court of common 
pleas has the authority to issue equitable, injunctive, and declaratory relief against 
state agencies.178  This conclusion becomes valid by examining Ohio Revised Code 
section 2743.039(A)(2)179 and judicial decisions which offer guidance, and more 
importantly, precedence.   
This position that the court of common pleas has the authority to issue equitable, 
injunctive, and declaratory relief against state agencies is strengthened in recent Ohio 
Court of Appeals decision.180  In Judy, the court of appeals held that claims for 
injunctive relief and simple reimbursement of improperly assessed fees against the 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles are not money damages.181  Additionally, the court ruled 
that the claims were within the exception provided for in Ohio Revised Code section 
2743.03(A)(2), and that the court of common pleas had the authority to hear the 
case.182  This type of injunctive and equitable relief in the form of simple 
reimbursement was the appropriate remedy in this decision.183  Moreover, it is 
apparent that Ohio courts have often ruled for plaintiffs in equitable, injunctive, and 
declaratory relief claims against state agencies, usually resulting in a refund of 
monies impermissibly taken by that agency.184  The following two cases not only 
                                                                
175Id. 
176Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees (No. 80353).   
177Id. (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the court in Ohio Hosp. Assn. noted that “[t]he 
reimbursement of monies withheld pursuant to an invalid administrative rule is equitable 
relief, not money damages, and is consequently not barred by sovereign immunity [because 
the State has previously consented to be sued on such matters]”  Id. (citing Ohio Hosp. Assn. 
v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services, 579 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1991)).   
178Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, at 8, Santos (No. 80353) 
179This provision of the Revised Code allows another Court of original jurisdiction (other 
than the Court of Claims) to hear and determine a civil action in which the sole relief that the 
claimant seeks against the state is a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable 
relief.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.039(A)(2) (Anderson 2001). 
180Judy v. State of Ohio, No. L-01-1200, 2001 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 5978 at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 6th Dist. Dec. 31, 2001), cert. granted, Judy v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 769 
N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 2002). 
181Id.  
182Id.  
183See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, at 15, Santos (No. 80353). 
184See id. 
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supplement the ideas laid out above, but also show that in this specific circumstance, 
refund of subrogation payments is a plausible and correct measure to take. 
In Ohio Hospital Ass’n v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Services,185 several hospitals 
sought an injunction and monetary relief from the Ohio Department of Human 
Services stemming from Human Services’ adoption of an administrative rule 
reducing Medicaid reimbursements, which the court ruled violated Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act.186  The Supreme Court of Ohio explained that the claim for 
reimbursement of monies was one for equitable relief rather than money damages, 
explaining that damages are given to a plaintiff to substitute for a loss, whereas 
equitable relief is given to give a plaintiff that which he is entitled to.187  Therefore, 
the court held that Human Services was not immune from money damages, and 
awarded relief in this circumstance.188 
Likewise, in Henley Health Care v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp.,189 a health 
care provider brought action against the Bureau for monetary relief stemming from 
the Bureau’s withholding of payments due to the provider for supplies given to 
workers’ compensation claimants.190  The Bureau withheld the payments because the 
provider allegedly broke certain rules.191  Those rules were later found to be invalid 
because they were properly promulgated under Chapter 119 of the Revised Code.192  
The court noted that the claims were truly equitable in nature, and the common pleas 
court would have jurisdiction.193  Therefore, the provider was permitted to seek 
reimbursement because they were entitled to the funds that were being withheld.194  
Like the plaintiffs in the preceding cases, injured workers in Ohio have had funds 
taken from them under a statute that has been decisively ruled unconstitutional by the 
highest court in the state.  The ruling in Holeton has made it perfectly clear that the 
Bureau has taken that which it had absolutely no right to take.195  Therefore, in light 
of statutory law and specific cases discussed above, the injured workers of Ohio are 
entitled to the over fifty million dollars that is owed to them.  The class action 
lawsuit should succeed for the reasons stated above, but more importantly, the 
injured workers of Ohio are entitled to refund of their money under an equitable 
theory of restitution.196 
                                                                
185579 N.E.2d 695, 695 (Ohio 1991). 
186Id. at 695. 
187Id. at 700.  
188Id. at 701. 
189No. 94APE08-1216, 1995 WL 92101 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. Feb. 23, 1995). 
190Id. 
191Id.  
192Id. 
193Id. at *2. 
194Henley, Health Care, 1995 WL 92101 at *4.  
195See generally Holeton, 748 N.E.2d at 1111. 
196Bashein, supra note 19, at 20. 
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C. An Equitable Theory of Restitution 
Injunctive and equitable relief in the form of reimbursement is an appropriate 
remedy under the equitable theory of restitution.197  Therefore, under this common 
law principle, the injured workers of Ohio have a solid argument for refund of their 
money.  In current law, a principle of restitution is closely associated with the idea 
that one ought to pay for a benefit that is unjustly retained.198  As noted by the Ohio 
Eighth District Court of Appeals in, “[r]estitution is an equitable remedy used to 
make an injured party whole.  At the core of the law of restitution is the principle 
that a person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to 
make restitution to the other . . . .”199  Therefore, it follows that if a government 
agency withholds funds that it was never entitled to, the agency is unjustly enriched 
and the common law demands restitution.  It is quite apparent here that the Bureau 
has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the injured workers of Ohio.200   
In the circumstance at hand, the Bureau refuses to refund all subrogation funds it 
has collected under the authority of an unconstitutional statute.  A principle of 
restitution requires that these injured workers be made whole, and this entails a full 
refund of the millions of dollars impermissibly and unfairly taken from them by the 
Bureau.201  It is perfectly clear that restitution is an appropriate and necessary action 
in this case, and until the refund of all subrogated monies occurs, the state of Ohio is 
still allowing an unconstitutional statute to hold some remnants of power. 
D.  Formulating a New Subrogation Statute 
Ohio has never had the benefit of a strong subrogation statute that prevents 
double recoveries and protects the rights of the injured worker and the statutory 
subrogee.  The subrogation statutes failed because there was not a fair balance of 
power between the parties, and the methodology that the statutes employed was 
flawed in many instances.  In creating a new statute, Ohio needs to examine 
alternative methods to achieving the goal of subrogation.  This can be done by 
examining the offensive portions of the 1995 statute, and looking to other state 
subrogation statutes for guidance.   
The Holeton decision and its various implications effectively left Ohio as the 
only state without a valid subrogation statute.202  The Ohio General Assembly, 
however, has begun work on a new subrogation statute that should surface sometime 
in the upcoming year.203  In an interesting and surprising move, the General 
Assembly has enlisted the help of both the Bureau and various plaintiff attorneys in 
                                                                
197Id. 
198KASTELY, ET AL. CONTRACTING LAW, 93 (2nd ed. 2000).  
199Bashein, supra note 19, at 20  (citing Colangelo v. Cahelmara, No. 57581, 1990 W.L. 
180653 at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Nov. 21, 1990)).  
200Bashein, supra note 19, at 20. 
201See id.  
202Stephen S. Mazzei, How will the Legislature Respond? Subrogation Around the 
Country, at 1 (August 9, 2001) (unpublished).   
203See Stocker, supra note 128. 
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order to formulate a workable statute that is fair to both sides, and presents few 
complications and little conflict between parties.  In mounting the difficult task of 
making Ohio’s new subrogation statute work effectively, it is important that the 
General Assembly begin by looking to other state subrogation statutes for statutory 
guidance.  In actuality, they need look no further than Pennsylvania for a subrogation 
model that works well and poses no threat to the injured worker’s constitutional 
rights.  The Pennsylvania subrogation statute is examined below, in light of the 
unconstitutional provisions that doomed the 1995 statute. 
The “estimated future values of compensation” provision in Ohio’s subrogation 
allowed the Bureau to collect additional monies from the injured workers’ settlement 
or judgment based on a estimate of what the Bureau would probably have to pay the 
injured worker in the future benefits.204  This provision caused great controversy, and 
was eventually deemed unconstitutional due to the many circumstances where the 
Bureau would take more than it was actually entitled to.205  Although Ohio’s method 
of providing the Bureau with future compensation was deemed unconstitutional, the 
majority of state subrogation statutes do allow an employer to sustain a valid 
subrogation claim for the actuarial future of additional compensation and benefits.206  
Only a minority of states limit subrogation claims to the actual amounts paid, 
without taking estimated future values of compensation into consideration.207  
Therefore, the General Assembly cannot simply ignore the statutory subrogee’s right 
to future values of compensation while creating the new statute.  Future values of 
compensation need to be included in Ohio’s subrogation statute in a way that is fully 
constitutional (i.e., not amounting to a taking in any given situation).  This can be 
accomplished by creating an appropriate methodology, which all relative parties can 
agree on, to which future interests may be decided.208  One such method that could 
easily work to solve the problem of estimated future values in Ohio is embedded in 
Pennsylvania’s statutory subrogation scheme.209 
Section 319 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act210 states that “[a]ny 
recovery against such third person in excess of the compensation theretofore paid by 
the employer shall be paid forthwith to the employee . . . and shall be treated as an 
advance payment by the employer on account of any future installments of 
compensation.”211  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania elaborated on this provision 
of the subrogation statute in P&R Welding & Fabricating v. Workmen’s Comp. 
Appeal Bd.212 
                                                                
204See supra text accompanying notes 67-72. 
205See supra text accompanying notes 77-81. 
206Id.  
207Id. 
208Id. at 3. 
209See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 671 (2001). 
210Id. 
211Id. (emphasis added). 
212701 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1997).  
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In P&R Welding, the court explained that a gross method should be used when 
determining an employer’s subrogation rights and liabilities in a third-party 
settlement.213  Under this method, “any balance of recovery [the amount available for 
future credits] is determined by deducting the employer’s accrued lien [monies 
which the employer has paid out in benefits to the injured worker] from the total 
recovery.”214  Then, “[t]he balance of recovery is . . . divided by the weekly 
compensation rate being paid to the workers’ compensation claimant in order to 
arrive at what is known as a ‘grace period.’”215  The grace period is simply the actual 
number of weeks in the future for which the employer does not have to pay 
claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits.216  Basically, whatever the claimant 
recovers in excess of what is owed to the employer goes directly to the future 
workers’ compensation benefits that the claimant is entitled to receive, by way of a 
“credit system.”  This somewhat confusing method can be simply illustrated by the 
facts in P&G Welding.  The claimant recovered $165,000 from the third-party 
tortfeasor.217  The money owed to the subrogee, or the “accrued lien,” totaled 
$117,167.25.218  The difference, or “balance of recovery” is, therefore, $47,832.74.219  
This balance is divided by the weekly compensation rate, and the grace period comes 
out to 142 weeks.220  The Bureau does not have to pay the claimant for 142 weeks, 
due to the $42,832.74 obtained in settlement with the third-party.221   
This subrogation method prevents a double recovery by the claimant, makes the 
statutory subrogee whole, and achieves the notion of “future compensation” without 
ever having to calculate an estimate.  Therefore, if this “credit” method was 
implemented in Ohio, there would be no chance of a prohibited taking occurring, and 
the statute might actually fly under the “constitutional radar.”  In the Pennsylvania 
statute’s simplicity, the purpose of subrogation is accomplished, and each party 
benefits equally.  Likewise, this statute provides insight as to the problem Holeton 
found in discriminating between settlements and judgments.   
                                                                
213Id. at 565; see also Darr Construction Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 
715 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1998).  
214P&R Welding, 701 A.2d at 563.  
215Id.  
216Id.  It is also important to note how attorney fees and costs are repaid to the claimant 
under Pennsylvania’s subrogation statute. Upon the claimant’s repayment of the accrued lien 
to the employer, the employer must immediately reimburse the claimant’s share of attorney 
fees and costs in recovering that amount.  Additionally, the remaining proportion of legal fees 
that can be attributed to the “balance of recovery” are paid back to the claimant on a pro-rata 
basis for each individual week that the employer does not have to make workers’ 
compensation payments, i.e., during the employer’s “grace period.”  This method can easily be 
instituted in Ohio if Pennsylvania’s subrogation method would be statutorily adopted.  Id.   
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 Id. 
218Id.  
219P&R Welding, 701 A.2d at 563. 
220Id.  
221Id. 
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Ohio’s subrogation statute also treated claimants who settled their claims 
differently from those who tried their claims.222  Interestingly, every other state’s 
subrogation statutes treat agreed upon settlements exactly the same as court 
judgments.223  Therefore, it is important that the language of Ohio’s new statute 
allow for relevant damages to be characterized in both settlements and judgments.224  
Under Pennsylvania’s subrogation statute, there is no provision that may be 
construed as creating a difference between settlements and judgments.225  
Pennsylvania recognizes that a statutory subrogee cannot touch damages which stem 
from pain and suffering or loss of consortium, and compensation for these damages 
may be negotiated through settlement procedures in lieu of trial.226  In either 
circumstance, damages are always classified to see which represent monies paid 
pursuant to a workers’ compensation program and those that do not. 
In this context, the biggest fear that the Bureau has is that they will be excluded 
from settlement proceedings, and therefore be unable to understand how damages 
were classified.  To remedy this situation, it is important that Ohio’s new statute 
require both the employee’s and the subrogee’s signature on a settlement agreement, 
consider settlements made without the subrogee’s knowledge void, and permit the 
employee and subrogee to agree to terms other than those expressly provided in the 
statute.227  With these provisions intact, settlements and judgments may be treated the 
same, damages will always be classified, and the injured worker’s constitutional due 
process rights will not be violated. 
Solving the major problems inherent in the 1995 subrogation statute will be the 
first steps for the General Assembly, in addition to making sure that each aspect of a 
new subrogation statute is constitutionally sound.  With subrogation statutes like 
Pennsylvania’s in mind, a new and stronger method for achieving the purpose of 
subrogation can be implemented.  As advocates from all respective parties work on a 
new statute, it is hopeful that Ohio’s new subrogation statute remains a statutory 
staple for years to come.  With a new statute, the tumultuous history of workers’ 
compensation subrogation in Ohio may give rise to a new era. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The state of subrogation rights in Ohio has been on thin ice from the very 
beginning.  The early absence of an Ohio statute that would effectively subrogate the 
employer to the employee’s claim against a third party created confusion and 
                                                                
222See supra text accompanying note 73-81.  
223See Mazzei, supra note 203, at 3.  
224Id. at 4. 
225See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 671 (2001). 
226See Darr Constr. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 715 A.2d 1075, 1079-80 (Pa. 
1998).  However, the Court also noted that “[w]e recognize that a potential for abuse exists in 
the structuring of loss of consortium settlements between a claimant and a third party 
tortfeasor due to the lack of participation by the employer in the proceeding.  Fear of abuse, 
however, is an impermissible basis upon which to require the forfeiture of a spouse’s valid 
recovery.  In the event a settlement is unreasonably apportioned, an employer may always 
seek recourse in the court of common pleas.”  Id. at 1081. 
227Mazzei, supra note 203, at 3.  
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disruption between the courts.228  Moreover, the 1993 subrogation statute was simply 
a worthless disaster, as it indiscriminately required subrogation claims to be paid in 
only limited instances and without regard to the actual amount of any double 
recovery received by the injured worker. 229  
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Holeton effectively perpetuated the 
many hardships that have plagued the history of workers’ compensation subrogation 
in the state of Ohio.  However, in disrupting the state of subrogation, the court 
correctly determined that the 1995 statute violated the constitutional rights of injured 
workers in Ohio.  Additionally, this decision opened the doors for the refund of all 
subrogation monies collected by the Bureau since 1995.  It is important to note that 
all subrogation payments by the injured workers of Ohio were non-voluntary.  The 
claimants had no choice but to comply with Ohio’s subrogation statute, even if it was 
clear that they were not receiving a double recovery.  This injustice needs to be 
remedied by the Ohio courts. 
Very simply, the injured workers of Ohio deserve to have that which was 
unconstitutionally taken from them returned, and both the basic principles of 
restitution and case law demand such a remedy.230  If the Ohio courts fail to refund 
these monies, the Bureau will be unjustly enriched, and that is inherently unfair.  
Before the state of Ohio moves on and develops a more productive and 
constitutionally sound statute, it is important that the court correct the mistakes the 
past subrogation statutes have created.  The troubles caused by the subrogation 
statutes cannot be quelled until the injured workers of Ohio are repaid.  Once that is 
done, the General Assembly can justifiably continue creating a new statute, and the 
state of Ohio can finally put the troublesome workers’ compensation subrogation 
statutes of the past behind them. 
VIII.  EPILOGUE 
As promised by the Ohio General Assembly, a new subrogation statute has 
surfaced since this Note was completed.  Signed into power on January 8, 2003, 
Senate Bill 227 effectively repealed the existing Ohio Revised Code Sections 
4123.93 and 4123.931 and implemented a new and improved subrogation statue, 
4123.931.231  The new subrogation statute has eliminated the unconstitutional 
provisions of the former subrogation statute and created a new formula aimed at 
achieving a fair and equitable result for both the claimant and statutory subrogee.232 
Under a careful analysis of the new 4123.931, it appears that the Ohio General 
Assembly has rectified the major problems inherent in the 1995 statute.  
Additionally, the new formula seems to be a more specific, stronger and balanced 
method for achieving the purposes of subrogation.  Time will tell if Ohio’s new 
subrogation statute passes constitutional muster and puts an end to the troublesome 
history of workers’ compensation subrogation in Ohio. 
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Additionally, on June 6, 2002, the Eighth District Court of Appeals came down 
with its decision in Santos v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.233  The Court 
ultimately held that “there is a presumption that a claim against the state should be 
filed [exclusively’ in the Court of Claims,” and thereafter found that the complaint 
(which sought the return of money subrogated under an unconstitutional statute) is a 
civil action at law which should be lodged in the Court of Claims.”234  On November 
20, 2002, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the appeal for review.235  Again, time 
will tell if the injured workers of Ohio are finally returned the fifty million dollars 
owed to them by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 
ANTHONY ALAN BAUCCO236 
                                                                
233Santos v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, No. 80353, 2002 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 
2784 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. June 6, 2002). 
234Id. at *10. 
235Santos v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 97 Ohio St. 3d 1459 (2002). 
236I would like to give special thanks to W. Craig Bashein and Suzanne Stocker for their 
knowledge, skill and expertise in the area of workers’ compensation law.  The advice and 
guidance that both Mr. Bashein and Ms. Stocker gave me while I was formulating my issues 
and constructing my Note was and continues to be greatly appreciated.  It was both a pleasure 
and a privilege to speak with the both of them on numerous occasions throughout this entire 
process.  Additionally, I would like to thank my advisor and Legal Writing Professor, Carolyn 
Broering-Jacobs, whose knowledge, patience and unwavering commitment to every aspect of 
this process helped me immensely. 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/6
